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In 1306, at the peak of a severe financial and monetary crisis, Philippe the Fair 
expelled the Jews from his kingdom, declared himself creditor of their debts, seized their 
property and auctioned it off. Was this a clever move, financially speaking? Did Philippe 
gain more, by killing the goose that laid the golden egg, than by securing a steady flow of 
taxes? Taking discounting into account, conservative bounds on the sum collected 
through the seizures over the years that followed the expulsion challenge the traditional 
view that it was a bad deal. Still, the windfall brought by the relative success of the 
operation was short-lived. 
                                           
1 This article has benefited from the assistance of many people. Special thanks must be given to 
my parents, as well as to Steven Bednarski, Loren Brandt, Isabelle Cochelin, Jon Cohen, Scott Eddie, Joe 
Ferrie, Tom Geraghty, John Munro, Gérard Nahon, Joseph Shatzmiller and Nathan Sussman, to the 
seminar participants at the “Monnaie, Fiscalité et Finance au temps de Philippe le Bel” one-day study 
group organized by the Comité pour l’Histoire Economique et Monétaire de la France (Paris, May 2004), 
and to the librarians at the Ecole des Chartes. Their thoughts proved invaluable and any errors or 
omissions are entirely my own.  
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I.  Problem & Context 
In 1306, Philippe IV of France, also known as Philippe the Fair, expelled all the 
Jews from his kingdom.  He declared himself creditor of their debts, seized their property 
and auctioned it off.  He undoubtedly did so knowing that he was eliminating a source of 
income, since he would be unable to collect future taxes from French Jews. Was killing 
the goose that laid the golden egg, from an economic standpoint, a wise move?  A careful 
study of the fourteenth-century French economy, combined with an analysis of the social 
and political context, can shed light on this question. 
The size of the sum eventually obtained by Philippe the Fair has already received 
scholarly attention.  Indeed, estimates vary greatly.  This issue, however, has never been 
approached from the perspective of comparing a stream of foregone taxes to the amount 
collected through the seizure (or captio).  This is critical since commenting upon absolute 
values for the confiscation, and ignoring discounting, provides scant information per se.  
Furthermore, the amount collected has not been appreciated in the light of the king’s 
fiscal needs, and we tentatively measure the contribution of the Jews’ seized wealth to the 
currency reinforcement that took place in 1306. 
Lazard first argued that the spoliation was a bad deal
2, which Jordan refers to  as 
the traditional view3.  Strayer, however, has argued that the expulsion “seems to have 
                                           
2 “ Les juifs étaient donc pour le roi de France une source sérieuse de revenus, et quand, en 1306, 
on les eut chassés, la vente de leurs biens fut loin de représenter un capital équivalent à celui que le roi 
perdait. Philippe le Bel avait fait, en les expulsant, une mauvaise action et, ce qui dut lui être plus 
sensible, une mauvaise affaire. ” L. Lazard, “Les revenus tirés des juifs de France,” Revue des Etudes 
Juives, 15 (1887), pp. 233-261; p. 241. Unless Lazard speaks of human capital, this reasoning is 
obviously flawed.  
3 W. C. Jordan, The French monarchy and the Jews (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1989), 
p. 209.   
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been fairly profitable,” but he did not furnish a precise criterion. 4    Saige and 
Schwarfuchs, on the other hand, agree that the auction fell short of yielding what the king 
had anticipated.5   These statements, however, do not suggest that this was a bad 
operation, − merely one that was not as profitable as had been expected.6  More recently, 
Jordan speaks of an “enormous windfal, followed (…) by a transfer of fixed capital to the 
most productive and aggressive members of the Third Estate.”
7 While the work of these 
researchers is helpful in assembling the various pieces of the puzzle, the few who have 
ventured into an assessment of the king’s manoeuver have not provided a direct answer to 
our questioning. 
Quantifying a precise estimate of the captio is impossible, given the state of 
documentation from the period.  The best we can hope to accomplish is to bound this 
controversial sum.  The sources available concerning the outcome of the spoliation are 
fragmented.  The inventory of accounts made after the king's death by Robert Mignon, 
clerc du roi, presents incomplete and disconnected pieces of information that are hard to 
                                           
4 “ The expulsion seems to have been fairly profitable judging by the entries in the registers, but 
the money came in slowly as goods were sold piece by piece ” J. R. Strayer, The Reign of Philippe the 
Fair (Princeton, 1980), p. 154. [Strayer’s “rough guess” is that the confiscation produced about 200,000 
livres tournois by the end of 1310, ibid.] 
  5 “ L'expulsion fut loin de produire les résultats que ses auteurs avaient espérés. D'un côté, les 
vols et détournements des agents, d'un autre le silence des débiteurs contre lesquels on ne retrouvait pas 
de titres; enfin la complicité de biens des gens, souvent même des officiers royaux d'un rang élevé, qui se 
firent receleurs pour le compte des juifs chassés, diminua grandement le profit escompté. ”  G. Saige, Les 
Juifs du Languedoc antérieurement au XIV
e siècle (Gregg: Franborough, 1971), p. 104. 
“ It would seem that Philip was not very happy with the result of his extortion ”, S. Schwarfuchs, ‘The 
Expulsion of the Jews from France’, Jewish Quarterly Review, 75 (1967) pp. 482-489; p. 488. 
 
6 Strayer, p. 84 : “ Sales of Jewish goods were still going on in 1314. The king even had to let 
Jews enter France temporarily to identify their creditors. ”  




use.8  However, they illuminate the difference between what the Jews lost (the amount of 
the seizure, i.e., what has been traditionally debated in the literature) and what the king 
himself got: Mignon writes in the 1320’s and 1330’s, and most of what is in his books 
regarding the Jewish spoliation deals with debts still outstanding.  The people in charge 
of collecting the money sent it to the royal coffers very reluctantly, and, as we shall see, it 
is very difficult even to impute what was eventually recovered and what remained in 
middlemen’s pockets. 
The Trésor des Chartes contains the royal archives beginning with Philippe the 
Fair.  Its data are available in print form in Viard and Fawtier.9  Still, the fragmentary 
nature of the information presents a major obstacle for scholars.  The documentation that 
has survived represents different types of transactions; but much of the information 
concerning mortgage debts has been lost.  Most acts are not registered and the book 
represents only a tiny fraction of the activity. The data pertaining to the Jewish seizure 
were conveniently compiled from the Trésor des Chartes by Luce10 and accord with the 
presentation found in Viard (the authors looked at the same source). The only local 
documents not present in the Trésor des Chartes and relevant to this study  that we are 
aware of were compiled by Saige and Gauthier.
11 
                                           
8 C.-V.  Langlois,  Inventaire d’anciens comptes royaux dressés par Robert Mignon (Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale, 1899). 
9 J. Viard, Les Journaux du Trésor de Philippe le Bel (Paris, 1940) and R. Fawtier, Registre du 
Trésor des Chartes (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1958); R. Fawtier and F. Maillard, Recueil des 
Historiens de la France. Documents financiers (t. III) : Comptes royaux 1285-1314 (t. II), Paris: Imp. 
Nat., 1954. 
10 S. Luce, “Catalogue des Documents du Trésor des Chartes,” Revue des Etudes Juives 2 (1881) 
pp. 1-72. 





The incompleteness of the data in the Trésor des Chartes is revealed by looking to 
specific regions.  For example, in Toulouse in 1306, only 15 percent of the auctions and 
product of the captio of Jewish wealth were recorded.  One knows this because one can 
compare the records of the sum collected in Toulouse that year with the records of 
individual seizures.  This presumes that the total for 1306 is exhaustive.  Most seizure or 
auction records do not mention final bids.  
Jordan, in examining Saige’s findings, argues that since Toulouse was better 
recorded, its figures could be used to extrapolate an estimate for the entire country.12  
For this conjecture to prove persuasive, we must assume not only correct figures for the 
Jewish population, but above all a homogeneous geographical distribution of Jewish 
wealth.  This seems unlikely.  The very discrepancy in the amount of data available 
between the South and the North must reflect a richer southern community.  And as 
Jordan himself points out, the more numerous and prosperous Jews of the South generally 
owned their own dwellings, whereas northerners rented theirs.  Domestic ownership may 
be seen as a good proxy for wealth during this time period.  By assuming that northern 
Jews were as rich as their southern co-religionists, an upper bound on the global estimate 
of the seized goods can be derived.  For the purpose of this paper, however, a lower 
bound is of greater interest: should it prove higher than any plausible counterfactual 
discounted stream of Jewish taxes, it would allow us to make a categorical statement on 
the operation.   
We find that, for any relevant time horizon, a conservative bound on the amount 
actually seized from the Jews proves superior to the taxes that could have been collected, 
using a lower bound on the interest rate used for discounting and an upper bound on the 
                                           
12 Jordan, p. 209.   
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value of the counterfactual tax revenues.  From there, we examine whether the spoliation 
windfall had any structural effects on the king’s finances or the economy as a whole. 
The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section two presents the causes of the 
expulsion and captio.  Section three examines what the king could hope for by seizing the 
Jews’ wealth and details the expulsion policy.  Section four analyzes the spoliation 
outcome.  Finally, section five concludes. 
Before beginning this analysis, however, let us review some details of late 
medieval French Jewry.
13  This will allow us to provide a better global context.   
Mass deportation, after all, had already taken place.  In 1182, Philippe II Augustus 
had expelled the Jews from the royal domain and had seized their property.  This move 
affected a few thousand French Jews.14  In the thirteenth century, expulsions became 
more common.  They occurred in Brittany in 1240, in Maine and Anjou in 1289.  The 
expelled Jews were prevented from seeking refuge in Gascony or in England because of 
the anti-Semitic policy fostered by Edward I, which climaxed with expulsions in 1289 
and 1290 respectively.15  In 1294, Count Louis of Nevers likewise expelled the Jews 
from his territory. 
What, to take the most comparable example, did England’s Edward I gain from 
the seizure?  Apparently, he did not gain a significant amount, since he distributed the 
                                           
13 We draw mainly from Jordan’s work for this review. 
 
14 B. Blumenkranz, Histoire des Juifs en France (Toulouse: Privat, 1972), pp. 4-5; Jordan, p. 180 
and p. 203. 
15  These expulsions followed accusations of ritual murder, but were mainly due to pressure 
exerted by Christian merchants seeking to eliminate Jewish competition.  Jordan, p. 182 : “ The forces of 
the merchant’s voices among other was that much stronger because they spoke to a shared notion of the 
Jews as nefarious. In the event, the economic constraints put on them in the 1270’s, and the charge of coin 
clipping made against them soon after created an opportune moment for Christian merchants to eliminate 
this source of competition. ” 
See also Blumenkranz, p. 17.  
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Jewish goods and properties to the four Mendicant orders. King Edward is said, however, 
to have offset the loss of Jewish taxes by means of levies from rival merchants.  There is 
no clear evidence of what happened in Anjou and Maine.16 
So, having been heavily taxed prior to being chased out, the displaced and 
impoverished English Jews fled to the kingdom of France.17  In 1291, Philippe the Fair 
ordered a stop to the influx of refugees, but then accepted them in return for a tax.
18  
According to William Jordan, Philippe “did not use the Jews as an object to make a major 
statement of his authority” at the beginning of his reign.19  Instead, he continued the 
more traditional royal attitude, developed during the half century prior to his reign: 
restrictions were imposed, both economic and social, to encourage conversion.  In short, 
the Jews were merely tolerated, but not accepted.20 
 
II.  The causes of the expulsion 
The expulsion of the Jews in 1306 was a direct result of the early-fourteenth 
century French currency crisis.  The Appendix reviews the problems of debasement 
associated with that crisis and readers who are not familiar with such issues are advised 
to read it first.  In brief, Philippe the Fair came under pressure to re-establish the “good 
                                           
16  Jordan, p. 185. 
17 Around 16,000 English Jews sought refuge in France.  Blumenkranz, p. 18. 
18 However, the nearby sénéchaussées of Saintonge and Poitou seem to have capitalized on the 
refugees influx:  “ This was a profitable operation (…) it increased the income from each sénéchaussée 
each term by at least 50 percent and yielded about 4,500 l.t. a year in Poitou and 5,000 l.t. a year in 
Saintonge (these totals are doubtless incomplete)  ”. Strayer, p. 148 
19 Jordan, p. 186. By the time Philippe the Fair came to power, “ acceptance of the dynasty was 
secure ” (Jordan, p. 179). 
20  Jordan, p. 202.  
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money” of his predecessor Louis IX.  The gros, created in 1266, had remained constant in 
value up to 1295.  By 1306, it had undergone a series of devaluations, reducing it to one-
third of its former worth.  
In times of need, such as war, canonists argued that the king had the right to 
change the value of the currency.  Nevertheless, it was felt that such actions should 
remain exceptional.21  Because lay nobles and the Church received revenues fixed in 
nominal amounts, tampering with money reduced their real incomes.  The Monarchy was 
dependent upon such allies should the kingdom be attacked.  Thus, elites did have 
bargaining power.  Furthermore, at times of such inflation, as induced by debasements, 
lenders and landowners also became poorer, triggering the ire of other wealthy social 
classes.  Hence, devaluation was not well received, and as a result, Philippe the Fair had 
to reduce the pressures he was under.   
The years 1302 through 1305 marked the peak of the financial crisis: in 1302, 
Philippe lost the battle of Courtrai against the Flemish; yet he was eventually victorious 
at Mons-en-Pévèle in 1304.  In June of 1305, he signed the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge.  
Between those events, uncertainty and tax pressures culminated.  An attempt to return to 
good money had already failed in 1303.  With the peace of Athis, the king lost any 
excuse to postpone the reinforcement.  
Thus, by 1305, it was felt that Philippe should restore the good money of Saint 
Louis, whose value per gros
22 reflected actual weight in coined silver.  However, given 
the real appreciation of silver over the previous forty years, the king could not go so far 
                                           
21  See J. Favier, Philippe le Bel (Paris: Fayard, 1978)  pp. 142-143 and p. 185 for a discussion of 
the king’s right over currency. 
 




as to restore the Saint Louis rate; he had no control over prices.  He could nevertheless 
propose a return to the rate of the early1290s: thirteen and a half deniers per gros.23 
However, just as “the weakening of money constituted a tax, its reinforcement 
motivates another one.”24  An obvious reason for this was that the king deprived himself 
of seigniorial revenues and needed to make up for them by other means.  Moreover, if 
prices did not adjust downward instantly and the king, already known for his spendthrift 
nature, needed to buy goods, the revaluation process could prove excessively costly.  
To cushion himself from this effect, Philippe needed extra resources.  The Treaty 
of Athis was supposed to bring him important sums from the Flemish, but the money did 
not arrive as expected and the king had to find alternate funds for the reinforcement.  It 
was for this reason that Philippe turned to Jewish property.  It certainly helped matters 
that the Jews were an obvious target because of their precarious social status. Moreover, 
Robert Mignon reported that the Church did not give any donation (subside) in 1306.  
This could only precipitate the captio decision. 
Now, in theory, the income generated by the auction of Jewish possessions would 
have been expressed in revalued currency.  Again, if prices were sticky, it made more 
sense to hold as many auctions as possible while prices were still high.  Once 
reinforcement took effect, values should overnight have been divided by three.25  Yet 
Blanchet and Dieudonné document that this was not the case.26  Why did this seizure 
                                           
23 This rate would soon increase to fifteen deniers on the market, according to A. Dieudonné, 
“Les variations Monétaires sous Philippe le Bel,” Le Moyen Age 18 (1905) pp. 217-257. 
24 L. Borrelli de Serres, “Les variations monétaires sous Philippe le Bel,” Gazette numismatique 
française 5 (1901-2) quoted by Dieudonné, p. 219 : “ L’émission d’une monnaie affaiblie équivalait à un 
impôt; le rétablissement de la bonne en motivait une autre ”. 
25 Since 41.5 is exactly three times 13.5.  See Appendix. 
26 It makes sense: if prices were not perfectly flexible in times of debasing, that is, when they 
should rise, obviously they would be even less so in times of reinforcement.  
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make particular sense in 1306?  The most likely driving force was the pressure to return 
to good money, but there were other reasons as well. 
One of them stems from the reality that, for the first time, French Jews were no 
longer indispensable.  According to Menache, “the expulsion of Jews was also 
conditioned by the capability of the court to find substitutes to take the role previously 
assigned to Jews as intermediaries.”27   Records from 1286, 1288 and 1293 attest to 
Jewish participation as tax collectors.  By 1306, however, the Italian bankers known as 
Biche et Mouche (Albizzo and Mosciatto Guidi) had replaced them in that capacity.28 
Furthermore, conditions deteriorated for Jewish businesses.29   New residency 
taxes were imposed upon Jewish immigrants even as fines were being levied upon native 
French Jews who supported them.  Both these factors contributed to Jewish 
impoverishment.  The policy of economic and social restrictions to encourage conversion 
similarly hampered the Jews’ ability to prosper.  Philippe the Fair repeated the 
prohibition against usury, traditional since Saint Louis but reconfirmed in 1299 and 1303.  
His administration tracked usury in otherwise legal debts, such as purchase on credit, 
making business conditions even less certain for French Jews. 
As a consequence of the sluggishness of their businesses during these years,  Jews 
were less able to pay their taxes.  This was no doubt in part due to a very real slowdown.  
Even tax collectors reported to the king that it was pointless to use force since it would 
                                                                                                                                        
  See Blanchet A., Dieudonné, A., Manuel de numismatique française (Paris, 1916). 
 
27 S. Menache, “The king, the Church and the Jews: some considerations on the Expulsion from 
England and France,” Journal of Medieval History 13 (1987), p. 230. 
28  Menache, pp. 230-231, Favier, p. 116. 
29 See G. Nahon, “Contributions à l’histoire des Juifs en France sous Philippe le Bel,” Revue des 
Etudes Juives. 121 (1962), pp. 59-80.  
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not provide the Jews with the money they owed.30  The revenues extracted from the 
Parisian tithe dropped from 125 livres and 10 sous in 1292, to 101 livres and 8 sous in 
1296, and to just 65 livres in 1301.  In part, this drop may be attributed to departures of 
Jews from Paris.  Still, if we consider that these figures are presented in nominal terms, 
and do not take into account devaluation, the magnitude of this impoverishment cannot 
be completely accounted for by that trend.  Poverty undoubtedly played a role.31 
Alternatively, Régné advances the hypothesis that Jews, at least in the south where 
this is documented, were increasingly seeking refuge in territories administered by 
independent feudal lords and bishops to escape royal fiscal pressure and that this trend 
precipitated the expulsion decision.
32   Indeed, many documents illustrate conflicts 
between the king and bishops or lords over Jews’ taxes in the years preceding the 
expulsion.
33  It appears that some Jews succeeded in freeing themselves from the royal 
tithe in this way, while bishops and lords were giving Jews fiscal incentives to do so. 
Thus, difficulties in extracting Jewish revenues contributed to the motive and 
timing of the seizure; for it was better to seize the capital of a taxpayer at a time when 
taxation yielded diminished revenues e.g., when the present value of taxation revenues 
becomes less than the value of capital. 
                                           
30 Favier, p. 198 : “ Les juifs paient de moins en moins facilement l’impôt. Mauvaise volonté 
pour une part. Incapacité surtout, que les gens du roi savent bien réelle, même si les juifs l’exagèrent. Les 
receveurs de l’impôt l’ont fait savoir : aucun recours à la force ne donnera aux juifs les liquidités dont ils 
manquent. ” 
31 The impoverishment of Jewish communities in the thirteenth century is taken up in Menache. 
32 J. Régné, Etude sur la condition des Juifs de Narbonne du V
e au XIV
e siècle, Narbonne, 1912. 
 
33 See G. Nahon, Condition Fiscale et Economique des Juifs in Juifs et Judaïsme de Languedoc, 




Other circumstantial motives played upon Philippe’s decision.  In 1306, the 
Parisian populace were enraged against the king.  Not only was currency constantly being 
manipulated, but there had been a flood and a subsequent shortage of food.
34  Currency 
reinforcement, affecting renters and debtors, could only worsen the plight of the city’s 
poor: a scapegoat was needed and the Jews were available.  This supports Trevor-Roper’s 
argument that “no ruler has ever carried out a policy of wholesale expulsion or 
destruction without the cooperation of society.”35  The king was also pressured by the 
Christian moneychangers who suffered from Jewish competition.  
Outside of purely economic grounds, religious factors must also be considered in 
reviewing the expulsion.  It has traditionally been accepted that religion was not 
Philippe’s primary motivator.  Yet at the time, various religious-based stories circulated 
to justify the king’s move.36  French monks, for example, viewed the expulsion as the 
consequence of a trial, fifteen years earlier, against a Jew for host desecration.37  
Augustine’s doctrine, moreover, was frequently cited: do not kill the Jews but chase them 
out and force them into exile.38  Pressures to convert were licit, as was the zeal to expel 
                                           
34 See Chronique Métrique attribuée à Geoffroy de Paris, ed. Armel Diverrès (Paris, 1956). 
 
35 H. Trevor-Roper, The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries and 
other essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 114.  
36 Jordan, p. 182. 
37 Accusations of host desecration have received ample attention from historians of late medieval 
Jewry. One scholar parallels it to cross desecration and other alleged forms of assaults against 
Christianity.  See the Index in J. Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews: the Medieval Conception of the 
Jew and Its Relation to Modern Anti-Semitism (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 
1983). 
 
38 The Jews had to remain as a remnant to testify to the truth of Christianity at the end of times, 
to serve as witness at the Last Judgment. Jordan, p181.  “Et hoc enim magnum est, quod Deus praestitit 
ecclesiae suae ubique diffusae, ut gens Judaea merito debellata et dispersa per terras, ne a nobis haec 
composita pretarentur, codices prophetarum nostrorum ubique portaret et inimica fidei nostrae testis fieret 




usurers.  In practice, however, mass expulsion of Jews was a policy neither affirmed nor 
supported by the Christian Church.
39 
Nevertheless, to be complete, let us recall that  Philippe the Fair, partly following 
the canonization of Louis IX, appears to have been convinced France was sanctified.  The 
conflict with the Church (Philippe’s excommunication and the Agnani incident took 
place only three years earlier) called for action in that direction.  Although history had 




III.  The potential payoff and the actual spoliation policy 
Data on the number of Jews living in France are deficient for this period. 41 Yet, 
we do know a fair amount about the attitude of the Monarchy towards them.  The king 
was adamant about preserving his authority over his Southern barons who claimed 
privileges with regards to the Jews.  The main motive for keeping the Jews in the 
kingdom was the tax revenues that they generated.  The king even went so far as to 
enforce repayment by indebted Christians in order that his Jews would have the means to 
pay the tithe.  
It is worth addressing a theoretical aspect of the French Jews’ wealth.  In the 
Middle Ages, the Jews did not have property but they had possessions, which in modern 
                                           
39 Jordan, p. 181. 
 
40 Jordan, p. 200. 
 
41 To assess the place of Jews in the French economy of 1306, it is first necessary to estimate 
their numbers.  Here again, we follow Jordan. The estimates vary from 45,000 to 140,000 for the royal 
domain.  To this one can add the number of Jews living under the dominion of other lords, another some 
30,000.  We thus arrive at a figure of about 100,000 Jews who were affected by the expulsion. Still, this 
figure is conservative.  Jordan, p. 202, remarks that a more plausible figure might be as high as 150,000 




terms is close to the notion of usufruct: when they did not pay a rent, they were always 
subject to potential expropriation.  Strictly speaking, one could not seize their goods, 
which made the whole spoliation impossible: the lord would be harmed when the Jews’ 
possessions were confiscated.  But reality was different.  During the thirteenth century, 
the number of buildings in Jewish hands increased significantly. 
The king’s purpose was the seizure of Jewish real estate as well as Jewish money 
and chattels not only within his own domain, but also within those of his vassals.  Above 
all else, however, he sought to procure Jewish debt.  While we have very little data on the 
scope of Jewish-owned debt, it probably constituted a major goal for the confiscation.  
This is apparent from the zeal later displayed in recovering moneys previously owed to 
Jews.42 
Jews were constantly pressured and exploited throughout Philippe the Fair’s reign.  
In 1285, they paid an exceptional and forced “Joyful coming to the throne” gift of 20,000 
livres.  The unusual tithe of 215,000 livres levied on the Jews during the Anglo-French 
war of 1294-1297 might have further convinced the king of their wealth and its 
availability.
43  Jordan, however, argues that French Jewry was close to financial ruin as a 
result of this event.
 44  Still, this did not prevent them from contributing a steady flow of 
taxes annually.  
                                           
42 In 1315, the search for Jewish debts was still so anchored that Louis X passed a law allowing 
Jews to come back to France to recall their debts… provided two-thirds be given to the Crown. Cf. 
Jordan, p. 240. 
43 L. Lazard “La fortune des Juifs en France au XIII
e siècle,” Annuaire des Archives Israélites 
(1891-1892), pp. 41-47. 
 
44 Jordan, pp. 205-206 and p. 198 : “ The take, if it had all been collected, was supposed to have 
come to 215,000 pounds. (Recall that an annual tallage of the Jews brought in 15,000) We must imagine 
that French Jewry was close to financial ruin as a result of this event. ”  
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Les Journaux du Trésor de Philippe le Bel report some figures, but generally for 
fixed, short spans of times within different years from 1298 to 1301.  It would be risky to  
extrapolate annual figures from those fragments only.  Fortunately, we have a figure of 
12,272 livres for 1299 — the only fully documented fiscal year available.45  We believe 
it reveals a valuable order of magnitude, confirmed by fragmentary tax data from 
previous and subsequent years. 46    They substantiate Jordan’s rule of thumb of 
approximately 15,000 livres per year collected in the late 1290s, early 1300s (excluding 
the extraordinary period 1294-1297).47  However, it is important to keep in mind that 
during that same period, the value of the currency deteriorated.  Therefore, expressed in 
the revalued currency of 1306, those nominal amounts would be much lower.  
Preparation for the expulsion was planned carefully, and it was coordinated 
efficiently throughout the kingdom, not only for crown lands as it had been in 1182.  The 
order, recorded in the Trésor des Chartes, is dated June 21 1306.  It was executed 
suddenly and few other documents are related to it.  Certainly, the scope of mass arrests 
of about 100,000 individuals over such a substantial territory is unprecedented.  The 
expelled population was given one month to depart; its members were permitted to bring 
with them only the barest of essentials.  It seems likely that the king sought to take 
French Jews by surprise in order to prevent them from concealing any wealth, yet he gave 
                                           
45 Viard, op cit. 
46 Lazard reports slightly different figures for the amount of taxes collected from the Jews. The 
origin of this puzzle is actually simple: Lazard makes the year start at Easter, as was customary in the 
Middle Ages, while Viard makes the year start in January. They both use the same source which is Latin 
Manuscript #9783 of the French National Library, part of the Trésor des Chartes. 
47 Jordan, p. 198.  
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them enough time (malignantly?) to bid for their prayer books when those were auctioned 
off.
48 
The king had a second reason to act quickly and decisively.  He no doubt sought to 
counteract preemptively any reluctance on the part of his vassals, whose own claim to 
authority over their Jews he challenged.  This did not, of course, prevent legal actions.  
The city of Rouen succeeded in retaining for itself most of the proceeds of the subsequent 
auctions 49.  Similar cases occurred in other locales, including Montpellier, whose Jews 
belonged legally to the king of Majorca.  Overall, although the expulsion was fast, the 
seizure was very slow and auctions were still taking place by the time Philippe died. 
A third reason for acting with speed may be attributed to popular reaction.  By 
moving quickly, the king hoped to leave Jewish wealth intact and prevent looting.  Of 
particular interest to the Crown were the Jewish books of account, where debts were 
recorded.  Christian debtors would have been more than happy to destroy them in order to 
cancel their debts.  However, the king seeked only the nominal part of the debts, not the 
prohibited interests.
50 Some Jews were allowed to remain in France to help read the 
books, written in Hebrew, which also indicates a lack of trust in French financial officers.  
                                           
48  Gauthier, p. 220. 
 
49 N. Golb, Les juifs de Rouen au Moyen-Age: portait d’une culture oubliée (Rouen: Publications 
de l'Université de Rouen, 1985) p. 407 and p. 409: “ Finalement le roi ne perçut que 2,400 livres sur la 
vente de tous les immeubles juifs de la ville de Rouen (...) En effet la ville put prouver, au cours d’un 
procès intenté devant le Parlement de Paris, aussitôt après la vente des biens juifs de Normandie, que les 
immeubles des juifs rouennais appartenaient à la ville. ” 
50 For more on this issue, see G. Caro. Sozial-und Wirtschafts-geschichte der Juden in Mittelalter 





By hiring Jews to manage the seized accounts, the king may have tried to prevent his own 
officers from embezzling.51 However, the results were still disappointing. 
 
IV.  The spoliation outcome 
Hence, beyond problems of data, suggestions of swindle on the part of collectors 
pose a major problem.  Jordan estimates that 30 to 40 percent of Jewish wealth 
disappeared into the pockets of middlemen, although it is hard to provide firm grounds 
for those figures.
52
 This does not mean, however, that it all disappeared fraudulently: as 
mentioned earlier, as a result of local resistance, the king was forced to abandon part of 
the wealth to local Church prelates, nobles or cities, as shown by a large number of the 
original documents presented by Luce.   
In view of the fragmentary state of the data, it is impossible to give a reliable point 
estimate figure of the global seizure.  Most sales records do not even mention bids.   
Favier wrote that a few hundred thousand livres were eventually collected in selling 
Jewish property.53  This, he adds, is without counting those debts that the king actually 
collected, something even more difficult to calculate. 
Most importantly, for our purposes, none of the estimates found in the literature 
takes discounting into account.  Yet this is key since the money from the spoliation was 
collected over a very long period of time.
54  At the beginning of the fourteenth century, 
                                           
51  Saige, p. 94 and p. 104 : “  De nombreux faits de recels étaient découverts malgré une 
ordonnance qui édictait des poursuites contre les receleurs ”. 
52 Jordan, p. 212 : “ Probably only about 60% or 70% of the total ever reached royal coffers ”.  
53 Favier, p. 199.  
54 By 1337 (!), Robert Mignon was still asking his services about some minor outstanding debts 




the commercial interest rate was 12 percent in Northern Italy.55   Yet, it is worth 
emphasizing, early-fourteenth-century princes did not enjoy good credit with the best 
merchants or with the wealthiest towns.  In the case of Philippe the Fair, although we 
generally do not know the rate at which he borrowed, there is no reason to assume 
creditors would have been more generous than the norm, given his probability of default; 
for in the end, instead of repaying his bankers, he banished them, cancelled his debts and 
destroyed the Order of Knights Templar, his principal creditor.56  For lack of a better 
estimate, we shall nonetheless hypothesize, for our discounting exercise, that the interest 
rate Philippe was facing was 12%.  
In order to analyze quantitative data, it is easier to proceed geographically. 
Records from places other than Toulouse, Beaucaire and Carcassone sénéchaussées are 
very scarce.  Table 1 indicates that, in those, the known amounts received by the king in 
revalued currency, add up to roughly 21,108 livres in absolute values and 20,454 livres, 
in 1306 terms, i.e., when taking discounting into account (column 3).  Once again, we 
know those numbers do not reflect the true magnitude of what was really collected.  Not 
only do we have many accounts of sales with no values mentioned, but we know from the 
manuscripts that some of these sales records, which are refered to in other documents, did 
not survive.  Therefore, we are really just looking at a lower bound, far below the true 
value. 
Table 2 is extracted from Robert Mignon’s books.  Almost all of the sums are 
debts outstanding that Mignon asks his servants to recover, long after Philippe’s death.  
                                           
55 J. H. Munro, “The Origin of the English ‘New Draperies’: The Resurrection of an Old Flemish 
Industry. 1270-1570,” in The New Draperies in the Low Countries and England, 1300-1800 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) : pp. 35-129. 
56 S. Homer and R. Sylla, A History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 1996) , p. 99.  
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These are the figures that Chazan comments upon.
57  Therefore, since our purpose is to 
put a lower bound on what the king received, we cannot use these data except from those 
in Bourges and Auvergne (1,628 livres after discounting) .  However, were we to make 
the assumption that the sums left as debits by the middlemen in charge of the seizure are 
second order in magnitude compared to what the kind actually retrieved, our case would 
be strengthened.  Finally, unfortunately, the document that Brussel used to report, in 1750 
a figure of 37,700 pounds collected for Orleans and its baillage, has been lost.
58 
Looking to the south, Jordan contends that in central Toulouse, which housed 
approximately 1,000 Jews, the seizures yielded revenues of 30,000 livres.  Through the 
extrapolation method, he reaches the conclusion that the order of magnitude is 3,000,000 
livres, again with the caveat that 30 or 40 percent of it might have disappeared before 
reaching the king’s coffers.59  For Toulouse and its sénéchaussée, Favier gives a figure 
of 75,000 livres, probably drawing from Saige.60 
However, Saige’s computation seems to be deficient in two ways, even though he 
did not give the details of how he reached that figure.  Let us first note that he did not 
substract payments to middlemen.  This is all right if our focus is the amount taken away 
from the Jews; but our main interest lies in what the king received.  More problematic is 
the fact that while some of the sums are given in weak currency, some are given in 
revalued currency; yet, Saige seems to have added them indiscriminantly.  Moreover, he 
                                           
57 R. Chazan, Medieval Jewry in Northern France (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins U P, 1973). 
58 N. Brussel, De l’usage des Fiefs, Paris, 1750, I, liv II, chap 29, p. 611. Nevertheless, historians 
consider Brussel’s figures reliable.  
 
59  Jordan, p. 212. This would amount to roughly 2,000,000 pounds for the king. Curiously, 
Jordan revises the estimate downward, seemingly to be on the safe side, and concludes that “1,000,000 
pounds for the crown is probably not far off the mark” (ibid). 
60 Favier, p. 199; Saige, p. 103.  
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did not use discounting, although the key original manuscript (AN, J 1030, #5) gives 
payments records from 1306 to 1315. 
In the Toulouse sénéchaussée, we are fortunate to have retained not only many 
auction records but totals, which of course do not match the individual auctions, since we 
have only fragments.  Therefore we disregard the individual auction records and focus on 
the different totals mentioned in the correspondance between Raymond Ysalguier, 
changeur de Toulouse, in charge of collecting the money seized from the Jews, Jean de 
Saint Just, clerc du roi, and Jean de Crepy, clerc du roi. Table 3 presents those totals by 
year. They amount to 47,409 livres of revalued currency in total over the years, and to 
38,091 livres when using discounting. 
Fortunately, it is well established that Jews in Beaucaire and Carcassonne 
sénéchaussées were more numerous and far more affluent than those in Toulouse
61, with 
Narbonne being probably the wealthiest city
62.  In short, this was due to the protection of 
local bishops and laic lords, who gave Jews more advantageous living conditions.  As a 
consequence, Jews were attracted to, or better said, were seeking refuge in these areas 
where their business and wealth could prosper more easily.
63 
So, for the purpose of a lower bound on what the king eventually collected from 
the seizure, we may advance the figure of 47,409 × 3 = 142,227 livres of strong, that is 
revalued, money for the entire Languedoc, and similarly 38,091 × 3 = 114,273 livres 
when using discounting.  When adding figures from table 1 and 2, we get 165,863 and 
                                           
61 See for example Bibiothèque Nationale. – Fonds Doat, tome XXXVII, folio 159; tome XCIII, 
folio 57; Archives de Narbonne, IX
e Thalamus, fol. 3 v°. See Saige, p. 19-49 and pp. 238-239. 
62 See Y. Dossat, “Les Juifs à Toulouse” in Juifs et Judaïsme de Languedoc, 1977, op cit. 
 
63 See Régné, op cit. and M-F. Godfroy, “Les juifs de la sénéchaussée de Carcassonne à la veille 




136,355 livres respectively. This lower bound is the benchmark against which we shall 
compare the value of the foregone taxes. 
Strayer’s estimates for the total seizure of Jewish property was around 200,000 
livres.64  Having considered local records and especially debts outstanding, we agree 
with Jordan this number seems greatly undervalued.  Above and beyond this money, 
Philippe also derived the ability to tax more heavily new owners of Jewish goods and 
property since their immobile wealth had been augmented.  Still, it is difficult to say if 
the tax pressure that followed the expulsion of the Jews is related to this change of 
ownership, since changes to taxation were so arbitrary under Philippe the Fair. 
In any event, the analysis shows that the confiscation was a wise move fiscally.  
Since, in times of peace, the Crown brought in annually from its Jews an average 
15,000 livres (and probably less in revalued currency), it is clear that the king would 
never have been able to raise as much money from them as he did by simply seizing their 
property.  This is borne out by a scenario in which we still retain a figure of 15,000 livres 
per year of Jewish taxes, notwithstanding the decline in Jewish economic activity and the 
tax evasion as well, over a nine year horizon (Philippe died in 1314).  Given that taxes 
were collected throughout the year, we could make the assumption that, by June 1306, 
Philippe had already made sure he had collected half of the yearly taxes he could have 
expected from the Jews.  Yet, it turns out this is not even necessary.  If we assume that 
Philippe lost all taxes from the Jews in 1306, an upper bound of the counterfactual 
amount of taxes over nine years, that is, the amount foregone due to the expulsion, would 
then be 9 × (15,000) = 135,000 livres in absolute terms, and using discounting, 
515 , 89 )
) 12 . 1 (
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 pounds.  We see that it is inferior to the lower bound on the 
                                           
64 Jordan, p. 212. See footnote 4.  
 
 22 
sums gained from the seizure. Notice that taking a higher interest rate, illustrating 
Philippe’s less than optimal credit rating, would only reinforce our argument. 
Furthermore, summing 15,000 pounds over an infinite horizon with a discount rate of 
12% gives a sum of only 140,000 pounds. Clearly, the operation was profitable over any 
sensible time horizon. This is even without considering the option of recall and 
subsequent heavy taxation of the Jews - which had worked to Philippe Augustus’ benefit 
one century earlier, and was precisely seized by Philippe le Fair’s successors. 
To summarize, the above analysis shows that the seizure of Jewish goods and 
properties must have brought more than a plausible counterfactual discounted stream of 
taxes and was therefore a profitable move for the king, financially speaking.  However, 
was the money collected through the auctions a necessary condition for the success of the 
reinforcement?  It is hard to answer this question definitively.  The task would be easier 
if, for example, an upper bound for the money collected from the Jews in 1306 proved 
second order, i.e. small compared to the amounts collected through other channels.   
Unfortunately, such a claim would just be a fair guess. Favier is particularly cautious in 
comparing the respective contributions of the different sources of money gathered.65  
Surely, the Jewish money could only help; to what extent is harder to determine.  
 From the (mostly incomplete) Tableaux des Recettes et des Depenses found in 
Viard, we can conjecture that the typical yearly royal budget was somewhere between 
700,000 and 900,000 livres tournois in the years 1298-1301. This is most likely a lower 
bound on the yearly expenses that occurred in the difficult years that followed. We find 
that up to two thirds of the revenues were a product of seigneuriage.  If we assume that a 
revaluation of the currency would deprive the king from much of this source of revenue, 
we can infer that a necessary condition for the renforcement was to retrieve at least that 
                                           
65 Favier, 193-194.  
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lost amount from other sources. The estimates we obtained from the overall Jewish captio 
show that it did represent a significant proportion. However, the sums seized in the year 
1306 appear more trivial. 
This may explain why the people who sacrificed the most following the expulsion 
were probably prelates and monks.  The king did intensify the tithe, particularly on the 
Church. 66    Among other steps that were taken to guarantee the success of the 
reinforcement, a significant one was a forced subside of five percent of all Church 
revenues; but the actual amount provided by the Church is not known.  The conflict of 
influences between the Monarchy and the Church motivated this move.  Certainly, the 
pope had no choice but to approve the expulsion; but he then had to bow to the 
subsequent tax increase, since it was brought on by religiously correct actions.  Philippe 
may have argued that he had to make up for the lost Jewish taxes.  Ultimately, this move 
increased royal centralization of power and placed restrictions upon the Church.67 
To be complete, we must also consider whether the expulsion had a negative 
shock on the economy and whether the sudden confiscation had a negative effect on the 
security of property.  Its impact on growth can hardly be quantified. We know however 
that, even though, in theory, lending for profit was forbidden to Christians, in practice, 
the latter, capitalizing on the new gap in the market, started charging higher interest rates 
once the competition was eliminated.68  From the available data, we can observe local 
                                           
66 Menache, pp. 231-232. 
67 Menache, ibid. 
68 C. Notargiacomo-Naniche, “La communauté juive de Paris sous Philippe le Bel,” M.A. Thesis, 
Faculté des Lettres, Université de Paris, 1968 (unpublished); p. 74.  See also Jordan, p. 215, Caro, p. 97. 
For this reason, the populace which was pleased to see the Jews flee in 1306, because of the high interests 
they charged, welcame the exiles with joy in 1315, when they were authorized back. (Gauthier, pp. 223-
224 and E. Boutaric, la France sous Philippe le Bel, Paris, 1861, p. 303)  
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economic decline only in certain areas such as the harbour of Narbonne, which actually 
may have prompted the comeback of the Jews in 1315.69   
Finally, if other Frenchmen felt insecure following the expulsion, might they not 
have retained their assets in liquid and unproductive forms, or refrained from investing?  
Given the special status of French Jews, this is unlikely.  Moreover, since Christian 
property rights per se were more or less well established under Philippe, sudden seizure 
was not feared.  At the same time, even prior to 1306, Philippe was well known for 
arbitrary taxation.  Because people had to sell properties to meet the burdens of imposts, 
this amounted to a form of confiscation.  The spoliation of Jewish property likely did not, 
therefore, affect people’s beliefs and behaviours.  Put differently, Philippe the Fair was 
already notorious for such ugly moves. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Did Philippe the Fair act cleverly, financially speaking, in expelling the Jews from 
his kingdom in 1306?  Undeniably he did so faced with mounting economic and social 
pressures.  Philippe was pushed towards a reinforcement he could scarcely postpone.  To 
that end, following the disappointed hopes for Flemish reparations, Philippe had to raise 
revenues to balance the lost amount of seigneuriage.  Politically, the Crown profited from 
the expulsion.  It helped Philippe consolidate his position in relation to the competing 
power of the Church and of the local lords, who were not authorized to bid for the Jewish 
                                           
69 Saige, pp. 104-105.  
See also C. Port, Essai sur l’histoire du commerce maritime de Narbonne, Durand, Paris, 1954, p. 
175 et sq. 
 





70  In the long run, however, the expulsion did not bring a solution to the 
currency crisis. 
The fragmented records of the Trésor des Chartes supported by data contained in 
local sources, and a very conservative method of extrapolation, allowed us to estimate a 
lower bound on the sums that reached the king’s coffers, somewhere in the range of 
140,000 livres – taking discounting into account.  We explained why we may take the 
most recent estimate (with no discounting), that of Jordan, in the range of 1,000,000 to 
2,000,000 livres, to be the corresponding upper bound. 
We compared a credible expectation of the discounted stream of annual taxes 
collected from French Jews to that lower bound estimate on the money gained from the 
seizure.  In so doing, we demonstrated that by seizing Jewish properties, the king was 
ultimately better off than he would have been had he borrowed the money and collected 
Jewish taxes to repay the loan, although he expected more than he ultimately received.  
Could Philippe have raised even greater funds by pressuring French Jews, as was done 
during the war of 1294-97?  This we cannot know from the sources.71 
Finally, a word is warranted on the success of the reinforcement over the long run.  
The goal of the spoliation was to cushion the costs of the operation, but did the spoliation 
in fact help to secure a return to “good money”?  It is already known that the return failed 
because of the structural reasons mentioned earlier.  Overshooting the increase in the 
                                           
70 Jordan, p. 212. 
 
71 Philippe the Fair died in 1314.  Even if he did consider the future well being of the Monarchy, 
he must have been aware that bringing the Jews back (and pressuring them) remained an option.  In point 
of fact, most Jews had returned after the expulsion that occurred under Philippe II Augustus.  Indeed, this 
is exactly what would happen in 1315 when Louis X authorized the return of the French Jews.  Actually, 
these people were made to pay 22,500 pounds plus a yearly subvention of 10,000 pounds for this right; 
they would also be heavily fined thereafter. Philippe V the Tall collected 75,000 pounds (half of the 
original fine) in 1321 following the alleged Lepers’ Plot, and French Jews were again expelled by Charles 
IV the Fair in 1322 (Jordan, p. 240).  
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price of silver by artificially inflating the rate of the gros and minting poorer quality 
money were obviously two determinants of inflation.  Nothing, however, could be done 
about the upward trend in the price of silver itself, which was determined solely by 
market conditions.  Economists today understand that when prices are not perfectly 
flexible and money expresses the actual value of its material, variations of the latter are 
always bound to destabilize the system.  Bimetallism worsened the situation with a 
fluctuating rate of both the nominal prices of silver and of gold.
72 
To conclude more generally, the Jews’ spoliation must be situated within the 
wider perspective of Philippe the Fair's confiscation policies.  According to Prou, any 
means was acceptable to Philippe.73  His was, after all, the so-called régime du bon 
plaisir.  For the first time since the ninth century, the king affirmed the superiority of the 
general interest of the kingdom over particular interests and the royal right over money to 
justify his economic and financial decisions.  After the expulsion of the Jews, the king 
expelled Lombard merchants and eradicated the Knights Templar, although it is far from 
clear that he destroyed the Temple for the sake of money.74  Finally, taken in the context 
of Philippe’s entire reign, the spoliation of the Jews seems to have been less of a 
calculated move than it was a decision made under pressure. 
                                           
72  Actually, from April 1306 to January 1311, the silver marc rose from 55 sous and 6 deniers to 
66 sous and 6 deniers, and, as in previous years, triggered a weakening of the money.  It was translated 
into the minting of new, overvalued, coins: the silver bourgeois and the gold agnel.  Ultimately, the 1306 
reinforcement lasted less than 5 years. 
 
73 M. Prou, “Esquisse de la politique monétaire des rois de France du Xe au XIIIe siècle,” in 
Entre camarades (Paris, Alcan, 1901), pp. 84-86. 
74 Favier, p. 199.  Concisely, the king held the Temple treasure temporarily as a deposit and was 
able to use it for treasury purposes.  Eventually, however, he remitted the sum to the Hospital, the Order 




Summary of the currency crisis in the early fourteenth century France
75 
 
In a nutshell, the whole issue boils down to silver. Silver is a good and serves as 
money at the same time, pure or alloyed in the form of coins.  In the late thirteenth 
century, the rise of the price of silver, expressed in terms of other goods, was essentially 
caused by growing economic activity and growing military outlays.  Since the supply 
failed to respond to growth of transactions or the king’s specific needs, the relative prices 
of silver went up.  Philippe the Fair was obsessed with keeping silver inside his borders 
and with attracting the precious metal; 76 to ensure this, he passed various laws to restrict 
outflows of silver.77  But, the market forces were stronger, and the king was forced to 
raise the price of silver to secure his intake. 78  Simultaneously, on top of the wars, the 
costs of Monarchy were on the rise, further increasing the king’s need for money.  The 
reaction of Philippe the Fair was to play the sorcerer's apprentice.  He was the first to 
“debase” openly in 1295.  What does this mean?  
                                           
75 See  e.g.,  http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/munro5/MONEYLEC.pdf and Peter Spufford’s 
Handbook of medieval exchange (London, Royal Historical Society, 1986) for a comprehensive summary 
of money and coinage issues in late medieval and early modern Europe, and 
http://classes.bnf.fr/franc/nav/index_rep.htm for the specific French context. 
 
76 This is not specific to Philippe the Fair. Apart from the sovereigns of the Italian kingdoms, all 
European monarchs tried to stop the silver hemorrhage. To understand the weight of this constraint, the 
shortage of silver was such that in 1309, the production of pure silver coins was stopped. 
See Favier, pp. 157-164. 
 
77 Silver is drained to the Black Sea and Egypt because of the specific patterns of trade of this 
era, mostly because silver is better valued there. 
  See R.-H. Bautier, ‘L’or et l’argent en Occident de la fin du XIII
e siècle au début du XIV
e siècle’, 
in Compte rendus de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, (1951) pp. 169-174. 
 
78 Formally the king sets the price, but he has to bow to the market conditions; otherwise, he 
would not receive silver from merchants.   
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Let us briefly review the currency system. Sums are expressed in terms of deniers, 
sous and livres (or pounds).79  It invariably takes twelve deniers to make one sou and 
twenty sous to make a pound.  The only way to pay one sou for example is to have twelve 
denier coins. Notice that the denier is made of an alloy, called billon, which contains 
some silver.  For the purpose of easing transactions, king Louis IX, in 1266 minted a coin 
of virtually pure silver (23/24) that was worth one sou, called  the gros.  There is a clear 
correspondence between the weight of silver and the value attached to the coin.  Now, 
what if the king decided that a gros is more than twelve deniers, that is, to debase the 
currency?  This can either reflect the rise of the price of silver or amount to a devaluation 
of the numeraire or both. 
In the past, the amount of money paid to the silver merchants was very close to the 
amount of money the king could coin.  But Philippe understood the potential benefit of 
debasing.  It is the same as printing paper money in modern times: the difference between 
the amount paid to the silver merchants and the value of the coins being direct 
seigniorage. Indeed, this resource represented up to 58 percent of the king’s income.80  
This was too much of a temptation, and, as an additional advantage, it was easier to raise 
money this way than by levying taxes. 
However, Philippe was not a complete thief. It was obvious that if prices did not 
adjust proportionally downward as a consequence of the growing scarcity of silver, 81 the 
                                           
79 We shall ignore the distinction between parisis and tournois pounds, automatically converting 
parisis pounds into tournois if need be. 
80 Favier, p. 151. 
81 Actually, all we need here is that prices do not adjust instantaneously; for suppose that prices 
do adjust, but never instantaneously, and the price of silver rises steadily in terms of all other goods.  
Then the king would lose money continuously if he did not make a discrete change in the system at some 
point.  The issue of price adjustment following the debasing of the currency, specifically when the king 
“overshoots”, is discussed later.  
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king could not pay silver a higher price per marc 82 and issue coins with the same buying 
power.  Hence, there was a need to revalue the gros; the same coin would now be valued 
at a higher price in nominal terms to reflect the higher price of silver contained in it. But 
Philippe realized that he could do better.  It is true that the coin should be reevaluated, but 
what would prevent him from “overshooting”?  Actually, he did, and the emission of a 15 
deniers gros instead of 12 deniers more than reflected the rise of the price of silver.  At 
this point, the “trick” seemed to work, and this first apparently successful try is key in 
understanding the policy that followed.  This move triggered a vicious circle.  Because 
the public was not fooled, prices rose,83  hence the king received taxes in “bad” or 
weakened money; moreover, the price of silver rose, too, thus spurring incentives for new 
adjustments.  Practically, the devaluation took place twice.84  We propose the following, 
crude summary. 
 
1285-1295: good money, price of a marc of silver from 54 to 58 sous. 
Saint Louis gros, up to 1295, officially set to equal 12 deniers, rising to 13 1/2 on 
the market. 
                                           
82 Standard weight measure for silver : one marc = 244,752 g. 
  83 Rolnick, A. J., Velde F. R., Weber W. E., ‘The debasement puzzle: an essay on medieval 
monetary history’, Journal of Economic History, 56 (1996) pp. 789-808. 
  The authors argue that price adjustment was quick (i.e., in terms of weeks). It is true that 
merchants could set their prices freely. However, given the Middle Ages legislation, it is not clear 
whether the argument that creditors and debtors could bypass the king by securing contracts in real (i.e., 
not nominal)  terms can hold. We are not aware of any such contract. Be that as it may, it remains 
precisely that adjustments egg the king on to debase again and add to the inflationary spiral.  
 
  84 See Blanchet and  Dieudonné, op cit. (1916). 
Only once does Philippe decide to coin a non-pure silver gros, and authors agree that this is the 
only time he can be suspected of sheer deception.  Otherwise, at the same time, debasing appears 
essentially in the quality of small coins (e.g. alteration of the quality of billon in deniers, doubles, mailles 
etc., so called black money; we shall not expand on this point which is very well documented by Blanchet 
and Dieudonné).  
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1295-1303: weakened money, price of a marc of silver from 61 to 104 sous. 
Gros in 1295 officially set to equal 15 deniers, rising steadily on the market. 
1303-1306: weak money, price of a marc of silver from 120 to 170 sous. 
Gros in 1303 (75 percent of silver) officially set to equal 26 1/4 deniers, rising 
steadily on the market. 
 
In 1306, the gros was valued at 41 1/2 deniers.  This reflected a dramatic 
depreciation of the alloy the denier was made of, pure speculation, and the fact that the 
best deniers were withheld from circulation by professionals (silversmiths) who extracted 
the silver in them, thus leaving in the public’s hands a  coin of very poor quality. The 
denier was then at its lowest.  
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Table 1: Auctions records in France, except Languedoc (Toulouse, Beaucaire, 
Carcassone sénéchausées) 
Year Place  Amounts  Type  of  money  In revalued    Same,   
          livres    discounted 
1306  Corbeille   520  weak*    173.33    173.33 
1306  Chalon/Buxy/Couches23,574  weak    (?)   7,858    7,858 
1306  Dijon    33,295  weak    11,098    11,098 
1307  Nimes    105  strong*  105    93.75 
1307  Orleans  140  weak    46.67    41.67 
1307  Chatillon  sur  Indre  80  strong    80    71.43 
1308  Dun-Le-roi   11  strong    11    9.82 
1308  Montpellier   193  strong    193    153.86 
1309  Paris    400  weak    133.33    94.9 
1309  Macon    50  strong    50    35.59 
1309  Troyes    256  strong    256    182.45 
1309  Paris    340  strong    340    242 
1310  Poissy    200  strong    200    127.1 
1311  Bourges   40  strong    40    22.7 
1311  Bourges   105  strong    105    59.92 
1312  Orleans  50  weak    16.67    8.5 
1313  Prouvins   400  strong    400    180.94 
 
   SUM     21,108    20,454 
 
* We translate the word faible (“faible monnaie”) as “weak” and similarly forte (“forte monnaie”) as 
“strong”, which is equivalent to revalued. 
 
Source: S. Luce “Catalogue des Documents du Trésor des Chartes,” Revue des Etudes Juives 2 (1881) pp. 
1-72. and L. Gauthier : “ Les Juifs dans les Deux Bourgognes, ” Revue des Etudes Juives, 49 (1904), pp. 208-229.   
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Table 2: records from Robert Mignon 
 
Year Place    Amount  (livres)    Type  of  money Type 
1311  Rouen   1,776 livres, 18 sous, 9 deniers strong*  debt  outstanding 
1311  Bourges  335 livres, 11 sous      strong    debt outstanding 
1306/10 Bourges  2,355 livres, 8 sous, 8 deniers   strong    received 
1309  Tours   3,300      strong   debt  outstanding 
1323  Rouen   26,887 livres, 19 sous, 7 deniers weak*    debt  outstanding 
1324  Gisors   1,811 livres, 17 sous, 11 deniers strong    debt  outstanding 
1309  Champagne  59,757 livres, 6 sous, 9 deniers weak    debt  outstanding 
 Troyes,  et  Maux 
1310  Vitry    22,694 livres, 5 sous, 3 deniers  stong (?)  debt outstanding 
  Chaumont  21,978 livres, 19 sous, 10 deniers strong  (?)  debt outstanding 
  unknown  84 livres, 13 sous, 2 deniers   strong   debt  outstanding 
1307  Auvergne  4,639 livres, 12 sous, 11 deniers weak    debt  outstanding 
1308  Auvergne  493 livres, 5 sous      weak    debt outstanding 
1313  Narbonne  1339 livres, 15 sous, 9 deniers strong   debt  outstanding 
1317  Champagne  13 sous, 3 deniers    strong   debt  outstanding 
1317  Narbonne  541 livres, 3 sous, 5 deniers   strong   debt  outstanding 
1317  Narbonne  1170 livres, 17 deniers   strong   debt  outstanding 
1318  Narbonne  900  livres     strong   received 
1337  Carcassone  86    livres     strong     debt  outstanding 
 
* We translate the word faible (“faible monnaie”) as “weak” and similarly forte (“forte monnaie”) as 
“strong”, which is equivalent to revalued. 
Source:  C.-V. Langlois, Inventaire d’anciens comptes royaux dressés par Robert Mignon (Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale, 1899), pp. 170-174, p. 186, pp. 247-272.  
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Table 3: Totals in Toulouse, by year 
             
Year  Original Amounts      Type of    =      = same, 
      currency  in  revalued  livres    discounted   
 
1306  +40,745 livres, 2 sous, 1denier  weak*   13,581.70139   
1306  −19,047 livres, 12 sous, 4 deniers  weak    6,349.205556   
1306         =  7,232.495833  7,232.5 
1306  240 marcs, six onces, six esterlings (silver)    1,190.475    1,190.48 
1306  7 marcs, sept onces, 2 esterlings (gold)    476.6409375    476.64 
1306  34 esterlings   (imputed silver)      0.5896875    0.6 
  
1308  29,180 livres, 24 sous, 8 deniers  strong*    29,181.23    23,263.1 
1310  692 livres, 11 sous, 4 deniers  strong    692.93     439.99 
1310  8634 livres, 16 sous, 2 deniers  strong    8,634.81    5,487.57 
 
      Total 47,409.18    38,090.88 
 
 
* We translate the word faible (“faible monnaie”) as “weak” and similarly forte (“forte monnaie”) as 
“strong”, which is equivalent to revalued. 
 
Source: Archives Nationales, J 1030, #5; see also Saige, p. 265 and sqq. 
  